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Husser' on the Artist and the Philosopher:
Aesthetical and Phenomenological Attitude
Introduction
n Western Philosophy, there is an old tradition establishing an
essential connection between an aesthetic, pleasing
contemplation and that of the curiously perceiving theoretical
spectator, who is interested in how the ''things themselves" really
are, both of which points of view are opposed to dealing with
things in a pragmatic context (i.e. as artifacL~). These two fonns of
life, that of the artist and the philosopher or scientist, have thus
been seen to have something in common, namely their way of
viewing and experiencing the world, their "world." Let me
paraphrase this way of experience the common phenomenological
tenD with attitude. These "special" attitudes, long before the
disciplines of aesthetics or epistemology came into being, have
been referred to as theoria (as e.g. in Aristotle) or, later, as
interesse loses Wohlgefallen, disinterested well-pleasing (e.g., in
Kant).' However, whereas the Kantian notion of a disinterested.
pleasurable viewing of the world outside of the rigid nexus of
causality seems to lead into a purely contemplative aesthetics
which can and should be achieved in order to reach a higher realm
where we are freed from the "bad" and "mean" world-as
Schopenhauer's aesthetics would have if-the Aristotelian notion
of theoria still retains a close link between the philosophical and
aesthetical attitudes in the following sense. Since the Greek world
view (Weltanschauung) conceives of the world as kOsmos-which
literally means decoration, even jewelry-viewing the world as it
really is by philosophical contemplation means perceiving it as a
universe of systematic order which is in itself understood as
rationally structured and, therefore, beautiful. Philosophical
contemplating is thus nothing but viewing the beauty of the world,
which is otherwise disclosed to the common, obscured eye.
Although the modem view on aesthetic contemplation (1 am not
talking about the discipline of aesthetics) seems to be rather
detached from the sphere of philosophy'-what could be more
stem and rigid than philosophy, being thus in strong opposition to
the playfulness and beauty of art? This has not always been the
case--and needn't be, either. Furthennore, since, as is well-known,
Husserl conceives of the attitude of the philosopher as a
"disinterested onlooker," it seems that in him we have a modem
witness to a position which enables us to reestablish a link between
both attitudes which in their own ways open up a universal,
totalizing view on the world. It was Husserl himself who drew
attention to this more than external parallel. I shall try to show that
this position can in fact let us gain a more universal and thus
legitirnizable view on the role of art in our world.
Thus, in my paper I will deal with these issues in four steps: both
higher-order attitudes have an underlying stratum from which they
emerge. Husserl has called this basic phenomenon of everydayexistence the natural attitude; hence I ftrst want to give a short
description of this attitude from where it is clear why this attitude
has to be overcome (1). Second, 1 will sketch out HusserJ's theory
of the phenomenological reduction, thus inaugurating the
philosophical (or in his words: phenomenological) attitude (II).
Next, 1 will elucidate Husserl's reflections on the aesthetical
attitude which can only be understood on the basis of the
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philosophical attitude. (III). Concluding, I will try
to compare both attitudes and give the upshot of
this parallel and the way we should account for art
in a corresponding aesthetical attitude, thus
spelling out Husserl"s intentions (IV).
Generally speaking, my interest in this paper
lies in the attitude of the one contemplating art,
not in its representation or substantiation in
concrete art forms, and it is my impression (from
my very limited knowledge of this discipline) that
contemporary art theory-even that which tries to
remain
faithful
to
phenomenological
description-has neglected this (correlative)
a~pect to a certain extent:

always intentionally directed towards things "out
there" in the world, we neglect that the world is
not existing for itself but for an experiencing
("constituting") subjectivity. The natural attitude
is in this sense naive, i.e., oblivious of the true
nature of its being. The person in the natural
attitude can be seen as (as Husserl sometimes calls
it) a "sleeping monad." The monad has not yet
awakend to its actual self-understanding.
This naivety can have a positive and a negative
connotation. The positive side is that the person
living in this natural attitude is not "faulty" of
being as he or she is, "always already"; it is not his
or her fault to live in this way and therefore not
"bad," but rather the basic mode of life people live
in, everybody, no matter who he or she is, when
we are in the daily modes of eating breakfast,
taking a cab, asking for the time, etc. It is in this
sense a basic life form we share in the objective
world and that even the philosopher has to live in
to a certain extent. The negative twist to the
natural attitude, however, is that it is nevertheless
limited since it is oblivious of the full meaning of
this life. Its "straight forward" way of living
towards the objective world means it has no notion
of the experiencing subjectivity who "has" the
world for its experience. It is thus oblivous of its
own involvement in the process of having the
world.
Yet there is still another essential reason why
the natural attitude is limited (which is merely an
extension of the frrst notion). Living naturally, we
don't know of this universal horizon called
"world," which is Husserl's term for the
objectivity of being. This normal executing of our
life always lives itself out in a certain context or,
as Husserl calls it, in a special world (Sonderwelt).
Examples of these contextual life forms are the
world of the home, of the job, of sports, business,
etc. We know of these situational contexts, and we
not only always already live in these worlds, but
we always and unknowingly live in attitudes
corresponding to these special worlds. However,
and more significantly, we automatically switch
attitudes and usually do so with great virtuosity:
the moment we get in a car we switch to the
"traffic attitude," while having immediately fazed
out the sports attitude we just now occupied while
having sat in the baseball stadium, etc. So this
switching around between many (maybe
innumerable) attitudes corresponding to special
worlds goes on within the natural attitude. This
behaviour is completely normal and thus belongs
to the natural attitude itself.

I. The Natural Attitude
The objection arising here, naturally, will be: if
we intend to talk about the attitude of the artist and
the philosopher, why start out the discussion with
the "natural" attitude as the basic substratum?
Shouldn't our aim be, precisely, to move away
from this basic life form in order to arrive at these
"higher-order" phenomena? True, but it is also
Husserl's claim that all human activity rests on
this basic phenomenon which he calls the natural
attitude. Not only do all actions stem from and
come forth from it, but also the philosophical and,
respecti vely, the aesthetical attitude can only be
characterized by that from which both of them
radically differ, and that is, again-the natural
attitude. Thus, it is indispensable to give a short
description of this first attitude to understand the
Husserlian conception; however, this first step
will also have to show the finitude and limitedness
of the natural attitude, for if it were in itself
complete and self-sufficient, there would be no
necessity to go beyond it.
This attitude is determined by the so-called
"general thesis of the natural attitude," meaning
that it is our basic belief that the world in which
we live, the things and people we have to do with,
and ourselves as part of this world, exist.' In other
words, we take this "existing" for granted, as it
were, and this implies, to use yet another term,
that the being of the world is "objectively"
existing (being means being objectively). But a
look at this objectivity reveals that it is always
objectivity-for an experiencing subjectivity. World
is always world-for-us (-for-me, -for-you). This
correlation between world and experiencing
subjectivity (in the broadest sense) Husserl has
called the correlational apriori. Hence, the
general thesis implies that the natural attitude
knows nothing of this correlation; since we are
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II. The Reduction and

But to get at its limitedness, let's take a look at
what is implied in an attitude as such. Within an
attitude I have certain experiences, in Husserl's
words: acts, which are directed at something.
However, it is the very essence of an act to not
have the thing "completely," I will only see one
side or profile of a thing, with the back side
unseen. But this back side can be made seen, e.g.,
by turning the thing around. Hence (to say it in a
very condensed form) an intentional act has the
character of a necessary unfuIfilment which points
beyond (to a "plus ultra"); it is not isolated but
takes place within a referential ne:(us. However
this nexus of pointing beyond is endless, there are
always more aspects which are unseen, hence the
acts are directed to an endless horizon-and
'world' is precisely the name for this horizon.
Now adding the phenomenon of attitude to this, it
is clear that if all acts stem from an attitude, then
this attitude will itself be endless in the sense that
there is no limit to the acts to be directed from the
horizon of an attitude correlating the horizon of
the world these acts are directed to.
Considering that we are talking of special
worlds and attitudes, we can now clarify what is
limited about them. If each attitude is directed
towards its endless horizon, it can essentially
never transcend this horizon. But we were
speaking of special worlds: that of sports, that of
business, etc. There is no criteria to privilege one
over the other. They are, in other words, relative
upon each other. But if being in one attitude means
never coming to an end within its confmes, then
this attitude does not realize its relativity. In other
words, it takes itself as absolute. And this is
precisely its limitedness: it sets itself as absolute
where it is in fact only relative.
But have we not said before that our natural life
is always already carried out in such a way that we
constantly switch between attitudes? Yes, but we
are naive about it, we are not aware of doing so.
This does not mean to blur the disctinction
between the relativities, but this in fact proves
their "existence." since it is one part of this natural
attitude to not be aware about this what "always
already" goes on-and besides, it does happen
that one gets, a.~ it were, "stuck" in one attitude, be
it that one has a car accident by being attuned to
the voice on the radio or that of his boss minutes
before, etc., and down to what we call plain
"narrow-mindedness," which means precisely
somebody's inability to see the world differently
than from his or her point of view"

the Pbenomenological Attitude
Thus, if the task of philosophy is to overcome
any kind of unreflected presuppositions, it is clear
from what has been said that the naivety of the
natural attitude must be made explicit, and making
it explicit means already having gone beyond it.
But what excactly is the reason for this leaving
behind, if 'naivety' is to mean more than a mere
polemicaJ. term ? Simply put: If the one living in
the natural attitude does not know of this essential
relativity, he or she cannot claim to have full selftransparency about him- or herself. If philosophy
in its most original sense is about enlightening
humankind and oneself, it makes sense postulating
to overcome the natural attitude in order to gain a
universaL uninhibited view on life. The method
Husserl employs in order to attain this is the
phenomenological reduction. Without wanting to
delve too deeply into this method of revealing
transcendental subjectivity, I want to focus on the
"metaphilosophical" intentions Husserl pursues in
this method. Very generally speaking, uncovering
transcendental subjectivity is nothing but
revealing humankind's most essential possibilities
as a rational being. In doing so, it is radical selfintrospection and inquiry. If it is about the loss of
naivety, then one task in this methodic step is to
reveal these relativities we are stuck in in the
natural attitude. This does not in any way mean
annihilating them-so little as the reduction
means gaining a view from nowhere or living in
an ivory tower-but understanding them in their
relati vity.
Thus, the natural attitude cannot be abandoned
or nullified. it can only be understood.7 It is this
full understanding that Husserl means by the term
absolute, the attaining of which being an endless
limit idea. It is only then that each individual can
claim for him- or herself to completely legitimize
one's own actions, if they are understood in the
absolute, encompassing consciousness of
transcendental life. Thus, the philosopher in
Husserl's view (the one performing the reduction)
is not leaving the world, is not detaching him- or
herself from action or dispensing oneself from
responsibility; rather, he or she is (and is only
then) the full person (or monad), fully awakend to
the understanding of one's own ultimate
possibilities. It is only then that he or she can
claim to take over responsibility for one's own
actions and for those of everybody elseeverybody else, in other words, who has not come
to the realization of being caught in the confines of
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the natural attitude. From this perspective we can
understand Husserl's characterization of the
philosophers as "functionaries of mankind.'"
In this tour de force in outlining the meaning of
the reduction, I have skipped the question of how
this reduction is at all motivated. If the natural
attitude is so limited and in this limitedness at the
same time endless, how can it ever be possible to
overcome it? Is this not futile or an undertaking
comparable to that of the legendary baron
Miinchhausen who pulls himself out of the swamp
by his own hair? Husserl has had some trouble
coming to tenns with this problem which he
clearly saw, but has tried to give a number of
answers. One solution is comparable to the
thaumdzein . It
is
Platonian-Aristotelian
astonishment that comes over certain individuals
which renders them speechless before the beauty
of the cosmos and leads them to abandon their old
dogmas and beliefs and to gain a new position on
the world, that of the pure theoria . Husserl once,
in a letter to the poet von Hofmannsthal, frames it
in another ancient methaphor:
As soon as the sphinx of knowledge has
posed its question, as soon as we have
gazed into the abysmal problem of the
possibility of a knowledge which is carried
out only in subjective experiences and yet
grasps an objectivity existing for itself,
then our stance on all pregiven knowledge
and on all pregiven being [ .. .J has become
radically different. Everything [has
become J
questionable,
everything
incomprehensible, enigmatic!9
Thus, the philosopher-or, strictly speaking,
he/she who becomes a philosopher by
experiencing this being overcome by unanswerble
questions, does not become so by his or her own
will or initiative, but because enigmatic questions
arise and pose themselves. The sphinx of
knowledge is a metaphor for genuine curiosity
originally inborn in the human race, which is
always already covered up by the situational
concerns and everyday problems of the natural
attitude. In other words, one becomes drawn in
into this sphere which detaches us from this
original state of affairs, a sphere where everything
we once took as known, becomes enigmatic. We
have now become "disinterested spectators"
"above" the natural attitude. This sphere we are
now attuned to in an uninterested way, to Husser!,
is nothing but that of radical self-introspection
which one has no knowledge of in the natural
attitude. It is the sphere of the full and real self
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which is still a terra incognitdOin the beginning,
after having just perfonned the reduction, but
which we can inquire into, And in Husserl's belief
in philosophy as rigorous science, we are called
upon to systematically analyze it as "disinterested
spectators," But this "sphere" or "region" as one
can metaphorically call it, is of course radically
different from any (actual) sphere in the world.
This means, concretely speaking, that we cannot
have any preconception of the typicality of that
which we are about to experience as we have in
worldly experience: whatever I will encounter in
the world I will know in its typicality (e.g., I might
not know this certain thing, but I will understand
it is a thing, etc.). Performing the reduction means
giving up on any preconceived typicality without
which we could not live naturally.
So, we can say, we have reduced ourselves to
absolute poverty of knowledge, we know nothing
of that which is "to come." But this "poverty" is
not an empoverishment; quite to the contrary: it
harbours an absolute potentiality or freedom :
since we are not limited in any way by relativities
whatsoever, we have the theoretical freedom of
thinking through every possibility, of entering any
sphere of the mind. Everything is possible and
thinkable, we can enjoy the theoretical delight, as
it were, to let our thoughts roam freely, to try out
new possibilities, to let ourselves be creative, etc.
This freedom is thus the mark of creativity which
great thought harbours and which is opposed to
the relativities and pragmatically oriented ways of
thought of everyday existence, where our
considerations are always limited by their
pragmatical context. Philosophical thought as
Husserl understands it, is the absolutely unleashed
and instantiated freedom of the rational mind
which is open toward every region of the world
and every possibility to be thought through by
imagination-:-however not in this "playful" sense
alone but in order to fulfill the very essence of
humanity in a responsible and legitimized way by
systematically working through the now open
horizons of problems, If I may say so,
phenomenology is emphatically "joyful science."
I realize that I have now characterized
Husserl's view of the philosophical attitude in
quite an unorthodox way; however, my aim was to
spell out Husserl's concrete intentions on the one
hand (which all too often are covered up by his
sometimes cryptic talk of the transcendental life)
and on the other to fonnulate it in a way to be in a
position to compare it to the aesthetical attitude,
which I shall undertake now.

SEB~IA
_N_L_UF!

_ __ _.........__ .... _._. _. __.. __

m. The Aesthetical Attitude

_ .__ .__ __

but is turned into a phenomenon. In the neutrality
modification it has the index of the "as if." This
does not in any way mean it is less real for us
contemplators. but we have detached ourselves
from the pragmatical context of our everyday
existence and view the world in the mode of the
"as if." " We have become "disinterested
spectators" in the sense that we view the totality of
what is outside of any pragmatically limited
context. •
So if we see a ;;normal" scene of such a
pragrnatical context in. say. a painting or a movie.
it is clear that we are not participating in it. on the
one hand (we are tmparticipating spectators). and
on the other. it in no way means that we are not
seeing this scene as what it is-a pragmatical
one--or that we cannot partake in the emotions it
evokes (sadness or happiness. etc.) but that we do
so in the mode of the "as if': this scene is as if it
were real (and the better the art piece the better its
depiction" ). However the compassion or sorrow I
feel is in fact real; there is no feeling-as-if.
However. this feeling I have which accompanies
my contemplation is detached from myself in the
sense that it is in fact my pain. etc .. but not
pertaining to me. although by the law of
motivation this scene might remind me of a
similar event I myself might have witnessed
earlier. I am detached from it in the sense that I do
not merely perceive it as something I myself have
to engage in but which reveals to me the "truth" of
this context as such.
So. one might ask. what is so special about this
contemplating if the only difference between
witnessing it in my daily existence and that of
contemplating it in an art piece is that one is in fact
real and the other is experienced as phenomenon?
This neutralizing of the existing world can only
occur on the basis that every special attitude
within the natural attitude is limited to its certain
world: the world of sports. of business. etc. But
the reason these attitudes are limited is precisely
because they are limited to that existing world.
The sports attitude cannot transcend the world of
sports. etc. However. the aesthetical attitude
(alongside the philosophical one) on the other
hand has the freedom to view all of these special
worlds in the aesthetical attitude, precisely
because it neutralizes the existence positing in the
same way as in the phenomenological reduction.
If the whole world becomes aesthetically reduced,
everything in it can be viewed in this modification
as aesthetical. The whole world has taken on a
new meaning, and once this new attitude has been

Husserl's claim is now that the philosophical
and aesthetical attitudes have essential features in
common. and if this is so, they must share this
commonality over against its opposite focal point:
the natural attitude. Let's again see what Husserl
has to say about the aesthetical attitude, once more
quoting from HusserJ's famous letter to Hugo von
Hofmannsthal:
Contemplation of a purely aesthetical artpiece is carried out in rigorous inhibition of
any existential positing [Stellungnahme) by
the intellect or every positing by feeling
and will, which pressupose an existential
positing. Or more precisely: The art-piece
puts us in the position of (as it were, draws
us into ) a state of purely aesthetical
contemplation which excludes every
positing. The more the existential world i,~
posited or is called upon in it~ liveliness.
the more existential positing the art-piece
asks for .... the less aesthetically pure is it.
.. .. [The "existential attitude" is) the
counter-pole to the mental attitude
[GeisteshaltungJ of purely aesthetical
contemplation and of the state of mood
accompanying it"
Although Husserl is certainly a child of his
time, especially in his privileging of the
"aesthetically pure" art-piece (which is apparently
purer the less sensual representation it has '2}-and
in no way do I want to defend this-let us see,
rather, what we can get out of this definition in
comparison with what his been said regarding the
philosophical attitude in order to gain a more
satisfying picture of what Husserl can offer for a
theory of the aesthetical attitude.
The frrst feature both the philosophical and
aesthetical attitudes have in common is that,
according to Husserl, both of them no longer stand
on the basis of the natural attitude. Aesthetical
contemplation, just as philosophical theoretizing,
excludes any positing of something as existing.
Does that mean what we contemplate in the
aesthetical attitude is less real or even nonexisting? Not at all. Rather, what goes on in the
"aesthetical reduction," as we may call it, is a
certain neutrality modification, which means that
we no longer are in the usual, pragmatical contexts
(the special worlds in their relativity) but in a
different stance which is completely different
from the usual special attitudes. In other words,
the world is now not posited as existing-as it is
in one way or the other in any natural artitude-
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reduction thus does not alter the sense of the
world, but places it into an encompa,~sing ,
universal understanding which is in this very
universality comparable to the phenomenogical
reduction.
It is from here that we can, concludingly, spell
out the philosophical consequences from this
analogy.

attaine<L it is impossible to go back into the old
state of affairs. Art can reveal the world to US as it
has never been seen before, precisely by showing
us the world as it always and usually is, but in an
attitude in which it has never been attained before.
As such, it can for the first time truly open up the
world for us. The Mona Lisa can for the first time
reveal to us what it mean:; to look ambiguously.
Beethoven's Fifth Symphony can reveal to us
what it means to be afraid of death. We are seeing
the same world, but with new eyes.
Now there seems to be another parallel to the
philosophical attitude which is important to
Hus serl , namely the question of how this attitude
can be attained. It is precisely this power the art
piece can gain over us which draw:; us into its
realm, and that means, correlatively speaking, to
lift us up out of the natural attitude. The encounter
with art can stun us, bewilder us, scare us,
fascinate us, giving us experiences that radically
break open the attitude we live in normally. Being
as such, it shows us not only the world, but also
ourselves in a different light. Thi:; radical change
of attitude means nothing else than getting to
know ourselves in a way that is impossible in any
context within the natural attitude. This break in
our normal living can happen by a slow shifting,
e.g., in a realist painting where the scene presented
seems to be almost like a photo with nothing
special about it-but it is this normality in the
depiction that we would otherwise never see
because we are always already immersed in the
context depicted now. Or the break can be drastic,
even violent, when our whole style of perception
is changed, e.g., in surrealistic paintings where the
whole act of seeing is called into question (and the
same would go for a 12 tone symphony in the
tonal art piece).
In short, the art piece has the power to lift us
out of the natural attitude. In this sense, what
motivates the aesthetical reduction i:; nothing but
art itself, thus changing our whole attitude in a
way that it excludes the general positing of the
being of the world. If this attitude is attaine<L it is
not the world that has changed, it is rather
ourselves who have changed our view on the
world and ourselves as a whole, in a way that we
see the world as we never could before. Whereas
everything is called into question, becomes
enigmatic, a new meaning, a new sense arises
through art which make us understand the world
more fully. This understanding is again not
radically different from natural "knowledge" but
makes this understanding explicit. The aesthetical

IV. Philosophical and Aesthetical Attitudes
as Ways of Getting to Understand the World
Now. if the phenomenological and the
aesthetical reduction can be compared and in this
sense explicated, as Husser! has it, then there must
be, concludingly, one more parallel which can
show us the consequence for the role of art in the
system of philosophy, as well as give us a clue for
a phenomenological theory of art.
Probably the most important trait of the
phenomenological attitude is the freedom of
thought which it can attain due to it~ detachment
from the natural attitude where nothing is
principally unknown but pre-known in its
typicality. Since it has no typicality in its new
sphere, it begin:; at the point of absolute poverty
but from there has the ability to build up sound
and philosophically legtimizable knowledge in
absolute freedom and as such serve humanity's
inborn telos of self-understanding. If the parallel
between both attitudes is plausible, this must also
hold for the aesthetical attitude. And it is, I
believe, in fact so. There is no sphere where there
is more freedom than in art. Art has no limits
wbatsoever, "everything goes" here, we are not
bound to space and time and their laws. Likewise,
the aesthetical reduction reduces the aesthetical
spectator to absolute poverty: he or she cannot
take over any preconceived notions from the
original sphere, but this poverty proves to be the
greatest richness for the absolute freedom of
human activity, beginning from thought but
extending to every form of human behaviour.
However, it i:; this far-reaching extending
which makes it so powerful. For this "anything
goes" is not to be mistaken with arbitrariness. And
this is where this freedom is limited and in this it
i,~ again conceived in parallel to the role of
philosophy. The philosopher as a "functionary of
mankind" must not just enjoy his theoretical
contemplation and thus remain detacbed from the
worl<L but he or she must re-inworld him- or
herself, make the results of this research known to
others and as such take over responsibility for
humankind as such, which is nothing else than that

51

SEBASTIAN LUFT

in its special and precious nature which otherwise
would have remained hidden-and all other forms
and devices we love art for.15
Thus, I want to end these considerations on a
more jocular note. At the end of his letter to von
Hofrnannsthal, Husserl becomes aware of this role
as rigorous philosopher and actually transgresses
this sphere in a self-ironical, self-referential way:
[Here goes] the incorrigible and genuine
profllSsor [again]! He cannot open his
mouth without giving a lecture.. .. I shall
not even begin saying anything about your
works. I think you are indifferent enough
towards praise as well as criticism and wise
talk: of any sort. And certainly and visibly
do you know the three golden rules of the
artist (in the broadest sense), which are at
the same time the open secrets of all true
grandeur, namely: I) that he have genius;
this he has in any case, otherwise he is no
artist; 2) that he follow purely and only his
demon in the way it drives him from inside
to spectating-blind effecting; 3) Everybody
else knows it better anyway, thus he ought
to view them all-either aesthetically or
phenomenologically.I'

which he or she has revealed in regressing back
into the depths of one' s transcendental
subjectivity, where he or she will fmd nothing but
the essence of subjectivity as such, which reveals
it<;elf to be transcendental intersubjectivity.
Likewise does the artist have a duty for
mankind. Art's purpose is not mere aesthetical
well-pleasing which offers a certain "relaxation"
from our everyday life, but the artist must partake
in the universal task to understand humanity- not
in the scientific sense, i.e., as philosophy as
rigorous science (and any other positive science)
does, but in its own way and in its own forms of
realizing the freedom of humankind as such which
is no longer bound to any particular set of values
or context~ . What Schiller has once said about
theatre thus would in Husserl's eyes apply to art as
such: it must be a "moral institution" (rrwralische
Anstalt), not in the sense of teaching people a
certain set of values but of posing existential
questions, e.g., what value as such is life, death,
being? Delving into the dephts of the human soul,
it must then likewise "rein world" itself (in a
concrete art form) in order to have the concrete
possibility to draw people into it or, meaning the
same thing, lift them up out of the natural attitude.
In this sense, thi~ position would radically be
opposed to that of, say, Adorno, according to
whom "lyrics after Ausschwitz is impossible."
Quite to the contrary, art is called upon to assume
its role in the context of a humane world. It would
be absurd, say, to view a movie like Schindler
List in an aesthetical attitude in the ordinary sense
(as a purely disinterested well-pleasing). More
than that, it would be irresponsible. This movie
can only be understood if viewed in its
enlightening function.
But whereas philosophy in the Husserlian sense
is bound to scientific analysis and systematic
knowledge, it seems to me that art is much freer in
the possibilities of its stylistic formations, and this
is the reason it can have much more impact on
people, since it doesn' t have to theoretize to make
its point. Rather, it has the freedom of a truly
playful, joyful wisdom which has by far not been
exhausted. Forms of this freedom which are
external to philosophy would be satire, where
something is grossly exaggerated for the sake of
emphasis; irony, where something is said "around
the comer" or from its opposite extreme; humor,
which makes it possible to attack somebody
without hurting his or her feelings ; allegory, where
constellations or structures become transparent;
metaphor, where something is expressed precisely

Notes
I It is interesting to note that the discipline of
aesthetics is actually a very late development
within the canonized philosophical systematics
of Western philosophy; the first Aesthetics (in the
modern sense) comes from Baumgarten in
1750/58: Aesthetica (2 vots). Cf. Historisches
Worterbuch der Philosophie, ed . J. Ritter,
Darmstadt 1971, Vol. I, col. 555-64.
2 Cf.
Schopenhauer, The World as Will and
Representation, Part IV. However, although
Schopenhauer criticizes Kant's theory of
aesthetic in the Critique of Judgment (essentially
for not doing justice to "real" art), his theory
could in fact be seen to have the intention to
"make" Kant "true."
J Although posonodem thought has significantly
dealt with art and aesthetics . I believe the
philosophico-historical roots for this lie for the
most part in Heidegger's turn to art in the time of
his Kehre, cf. "Der Ursprung des Kunsterkes"
(1935/36), in: Holzwege, Klostermann 1950, pp.

s

1-72.
• Cf. A. Casebier, Film and Phenomenology
(Cambridge 1991), which has the subtitle:
"Toward a Realist Theory of Cinematic
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Representation." Here we find a fine analysis of
cinematographic representation in a Husserlian
vein (with. however, mainly taking the Logical
Investigations and Ideas I into consideration),
however no attention whatsoever is paid to the
phenomenon of attitude correlating any kind of
cinematographic presentation.
, Cf. Ideas I, §§ 27-32.
6 However, it does not take a philosopher to detect
simple narrow-mindedness! For a more detailed
treatment of the theory of the natural attitude, cf.
my "Husser!'s Phenomenological Discovery of
the Natural Attitude," in Continental Philosophy
Review 31 (1998), pp. 153- 170.
7 Cf.
Cartesian Meditations, The Hague 1950
(transl. D. Cairns). p. 151: "phenomenological
explication does nothing bw explicate the sense
this world has for us all, prior to any
philosophizing, and obviously gets solely from
our experience - a sense which philosophy can
uncover but never alter .... "
• Cf. The Crisis of European Sciences and
Transcendental Phen omenology (Evanston
1970), p. 17.
9 From
Husserl's
letter to Hugo
von
Hofmannsthal, Jan. 12, 1907, in: Edmund
Husserl, Briefwechsel, ed. by Karl and Elisabeth
Schuhmann, DordrechtIBostonILondon 1993,
Husserliana-Dokurnente mn, p. 134 (my
translation). Cf. also Hua. XXlV, p. 397 ff.
10 As such, Husserl also calls it "das gelobte Land"
(the "promised land") of philosophy. Cf. Hua. V,
p. 161.
11 " Die
Anschauung eines rein iisthetischen
Kunstwerks vollzieht sich in strenger
Ausschaltung jeder existenzialen Stellungnahme
des Intellects und jeder Stellungnahme des
Gefiihls u. Willens, die solche eine existenziale
Stellungnahme voraussetzt. Oder besser: Das
Kunstwerk versetzt uns (erzwingt es gleichsam)
in den Zustand rein iisthetischer, jene
Stellungnahme ausschlieBenden Anschauung. Je
mehr von der Existenzialen Welt anklingt oder
lebendig herangezogen wird, je mehr an
existenzialer Stellungnahme das Kunstwerk von
sich aus anfordert [... j, urn so weniger ist das
Werk iisthetisch rein . [ ... ] [Die natiirliche
Einstellung ist] der Gegenpol zur Geisteshaltung
der rein iisthetischen Anschauung und der ihr
entsprechenden Gefiihlslage." Op. cit., p. 133 f.
(my translation). It should be added that this
letter is from 1907, when Husserl had just
"discovered"
the
method
of
the
phenomenological reduction, and hence his

terminology is not yet fully developed.
However, I think it is clear from the content that
this description of the "positing" of the
"existential world" is essentially the same
phenomenon as that what he, as of 1913 (firstly
in the Ideas I), terms "natural attitude."
I; One might note that Schopenhauer was one of
the first philosophers Husserl read in his youth.
Schopenhauer's privileging of music over every
other art form might play a role in Husser!'s
position here.
13 Cf. Husserliana VIII, pp. 112-120 (on positional
and quasi-positional acts).
14 In this sense, I would object to Husserl's thesis
that the art piece is "purer" the less
"existentiality" it has. As it is, one would have to
define the sense of "pure" here more in detail.
IS I want to leave open the question what this
would mean for an aesthetics where these
disciplines are precisely merged, e.g. in
Nietzsche 's "philosophy," in which it is his
point that philosophy becomes aestheticized.
Certainly, for Husserl it would be unhealthy to
merge disciplines. But maybe in this point
Husserl is mistaken.
16 Letter to von Hoffmansthal, op. cit, p. 135 f.
"Der unverbesserliche u. unverfalschte
Professor! Er kann nieht den Mund aufthun,
ohne ein Colleg zu halten! [... ] tiber Ihre Werke
etwas zu sagen, werde ich mich sehr hi.iten. Ich
denke, Lob wie Tadel und weises Gerede jeder
Art sind Ihnen schon hinreichend gleichgiltig.
Und die drei goldenen Regeln des Kiinstlers (im
weitesten Sinne), zugleich die offenen
Geheimnisse aller wahren GroBe, sind Ihnen
sicherlich und sichtbarlich bekannt: namlicb I)
Er habe Genie - das hat er ohnehin, sonst ist er
kein Ktinstler. 2) Er folge rein und einzig
seinem Daimonion, wie es ibn von innen her zu
schauend-blindem WITken treibt. 3) Aile
Anderen wissen es ohnehin besser, also
betrachte er sie alle - bloB iisthetisch oder
phlinomenologisch. "
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